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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
In this case, we must decide whether the New Jersey 
Prevailing Wage Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.25, et seq. 
(“PWA”) is completely preempted by either the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., or the Labor Management Relations 
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq.  Because we 
conclude that neither statute completely preempts the PWA, 
the District Court was without jurisdiction to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.  We will therefore vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand the action with instructions 
to remand it to state court. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 The PWA provides that laborers on certain public 
works projects are to be paid the prevailing wage.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 34:11-56.27.  It was enacted to “establish a prevailing 
wage level for workmen engaged in public works in order to 
safeguard their efficiency and general well-being and to 
protect them as well as their employers from the effects of 
serious and unfair competition resulting from wage levels 
detrimental to efficiency and well-being.”  Id. § 34:11-56.25; 
see also Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc., 981 A.2d 1267, 
1271 (N.J. 2009).  A “public work” falls within the PWA if it 
is “paid for in whole or in part out of the funds of a public 
body” (except work done pursuant to rehabilitation 
programs), or if at the time of entering into the contract, the 
property where the labor is performed is owned or 
substantially leased by a public body.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
34:11-56.26(5).  The PWA applies to all contracts where the 
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total value of the project exceeds $14,187.00 if the work is 
being done for, or on the premises of, any municipality, or 
$2,000.00 if the work is being done for, or on the premises of, 
any other public entity.  N.J. Admin. Code § 12:60-1.4(b) 
(2009). 
 
 The “prevailing wage” is defined as the “wage rate 
paid by virtue of collective bargaining agreements [“CBAs”] 
by employers employing a majority of workers of that craft or 
trade subject to said [CBAs], in the locality in which the 
public work is done.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.26(9).  It is 
set every two years by the New Jersey Commissioner of 
Labor and Workforce Development (“Commissioner”).  Id. § 
34:11-56.30.  To set the prevailing wage rate for each 
locality, the Commissioner references the rates paid in 
various CBAs — cash and benefits (including employer 
contributions) — in different parts of the state.  Id.  The 
prevailing wage must be specified in the contract between the 
awarding entity and contractor or subcontractor.  Id. § 34:11-
56.28.  The actual amount of compensation cannot be below 
the prevailing wage rate, but may exceed it.  Id.   
 
 The prevailing wage schedule that the Commissioner 
publishes for each locality contains a wage rate per hour and a 
fringe benefit rate per hour.  Employers may count certain 
types of fringe benefits bestowed upon employees against the 
fringe benefit rate per hour.  Employers providing benefits 
worth less than the fringe benefit rate per hour (or no benefits 
at all) must pay the balance to the employee in cash.  The 
PWA does not mandate any specific types of fringe benefits, 
nor does it mandate that an employer provide fringe benefits 
at all. 
 
 In addition, the PWA requires that every contractor 
and subcontractor keep a record detailing the worker’s name, 
his or her craft or trade, and actual hourly rate of wages paid 
to each worker.  Id. § 34:11-56.29.  The employer must 
preserve these records for two years.  Id.   
 
 If a worker believes that he or she has been paid less 
than the prevailing wage, that worker may file a complaint 
with the Commissioner, who has the authority to investigate 
and administratively sanction violators.  Id. §§ 34:11-56.34; 
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34:11-56.35.  Such worker may also initiate a civil action to 
recover the full amount of the prevailing wage (less any 
wages actually received), regardless of any contract to the 
contrary.  Id. § 34:11-40.  The right to prevailing wages is 
inalienable, as “any agreement between such workman and 
the employer to work for less than such prevailing wage shall 
be no defense to the action.”  Id.  Workers may bring this 
civil action themselves or “may designate an agent or 
representative to maintain” such an action on their behalf.  Id. 
 
B. 
 
 We take the following facts from the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, which we assume to be true for the purposes of a 
motion to dismiss.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).  The workers at issue in this case 
were carpenters hired to work on the Revel Casino Project in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey.  They contend that the Revel 
Casino Project is a “public work” within the meaning of the 
PWA because it received financial assistance in the form of 
incentives, tax exemptions, and tax reimbursements from the 
New Jersey Economic Development Authority (“EDA”).  
They claim that the EDA is a “public body” within the 
meaning of the Act.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.26(4).   
 
 The carpenters contend that their employer, 
Simon/Watt, did not pay them fringe benefits as required by 
the PWA.  They assigned these claims for unpaid prevailing 
wages to the plaintiffs, who describe themselves as employee 
benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA and trust funds 
within the meaning of the LMRA.  The plaintiffs allege that 
the defendant, Tishman Construction Corp. of New Jersey, 
was the general contractor and/or construction manager on 
the Revel Casino Project and subcontracted certain carpentry 
work to Simon/Watt. 
 
 The plaintiffs initially brought suit in New Jersey state 
court, alleging violations of the EDA Act and PWA.
1
  The 
                                              
1
 The EDA Act simply requires that the New Jersey 
Economic Development Authority adopt rules requiring 
workers to be paid at least the prevailing wage (as defined by 
the Commissioner pursuant to the PWA) in connection with 
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defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to the “complete preemption” 
doctrine.  It contended that the complaint was completely 
preempted pursuant to ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), 
because the plaintiffs’ cause of action was actually one to 
collect benefits due.  The defendant also claimed that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 185, because resolution of the dispute involved 
interpretation of a CBA.  After removal, the plaintiffs moved 
to remand, and the defendant moved to dismiss. 
 
 The District Court agreed with the defendant’s 
characterization of the action and held that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were completely preempted under ERISA § 502(a).  It 
concluded that the action was properly removed because the 
plaintiffs “are ERISA participants seeking rights under an 
ERISA plan.”  Appendix (“App.”) 15a.  Although it did not 
directly address LMRA complete preemption, the court also 
noted that the complaint “seeks interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.”  Id.   
 
The District Court also concluded that the action was 
expressly preempted by ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, and 
dismissed the complaint.  It reasoned that because the 
plaintiffs themselves were employee benefit plans and 
fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA, and because they 
sought to collect fringe benefits, their claims “relate[d] to” an 
ERISA-governed benefit plan and were preempted.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction over the final decision of the 
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on 
ERISA preemption is plenary.  Pryzbowski v. U.S. 
                                                                                                     
EDA projects (provided certain conditions are met).  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:1B-5.1.  In other words, it governs the scope 
of projects that are subject to the PWA.  For our purposes, the 
substantive analysis is the same as that of the PWA:  if the 
EDA Act applies, then the defendant owed the plaintiffs 
compensation as defined by the PWA. 
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Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 2001).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  A complaint has facial 
plausibility when there is enough factual content “that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A court must accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. 
 
III. 
 
Before we can reach the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims are expressly preempted by ERISA § 514, we must 
first determine whether there is subject matter jurisdiction 
over the plaintiffs’ PWA claims in federal court.  Complete 
preemption under § 502(a) is a “jurisdictional concept,” 
whereas express preemption under § 514 is a “substantive 
concept governing the applicable law.”  In re U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).  Because subject 
matter jurisdiction involves “a court’s power to hear a case,” 
we have an “independent obligation to determine whether 
subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
A cause of action does not typically “arise under” 
federal law unless a federal question appears on the face of a 
well-pleaded complaint.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. 
Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).  
The existence or expectation of a federal defense is 
insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.  Pryzbowski, 245 
F.3d at 271.  There exists a “narrow exception” to the well-
pleaded complaint rule for instances where Congress “has 
expressed its intent to completely pre-empt a particular area 
of law such that any claim that falls within this area is 
necessarily federal in character.”  U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d 
at 160 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
While other types of preemption operate only as 
federal defenses to state law claims, complete preemption 
“operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction 
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notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on 
the face of the complaint.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized the “complete preemption” doctrine in only three 
instances:  § 301 of the LMRA, see Avco Corp. v. 
Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); § 502(a) of ERISA, see 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); and §§ 85 
and 86 of the National Bank Act, see Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).  The former two are relevant 
here. 
 
A. 
 
We begin with ERISA § 502(a), the only ground for 
complete preemption that the District Court found.  ERISA 
provides for uniform federal regulation of pension benefit 
plans and welfare benefit plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).  
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that benefit plan 
administration was subject to a single set of regulations and to 
avoid subjecting regulated entities to conflicting sources of 
substantive law.  N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995).  
These concerns generally arise only when the provision of 
benefits requires “an ongoing administrative program.”  Fort 
Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).  
ERISA included “expansive” preemption provisions, see 
ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, “which are intended to 
ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be 
exclusively a federal concern,” Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 
542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quotation marks omitted).  
Congress preempted “state laws relating to plans, rather than 
simply to benefits.”  Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11. 
 
ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism, § 502(a), “is 
one of those provisions with such extraordinary pre-emptive 
power that it converts an ordinary state common law 
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule,” and permits removal.  Aetna 
Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quotation marks omitted).  We have 
held that a claim is completely preempted, and thus 
removable, under ERISA § 502(a) only if:  (1) the plaintiff 
could have brought the claim under § 502(a); and (2) no other 
independent legal duty supports the plaintiff’s claim.  Pascack 
Valley Hosp. Inc. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare 
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Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2004); see 
also Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 210.  Because the test is 
conjunctive, a state-law cause of action is completely 
preempted only if both of its prongs are satisfied.  See 
Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 
328 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 
The defendant contends that the suit is preempted 
because the plaintiffs seek to collect “delinquent fund 
contributions.”  Defendant’s Br. 15.  It contends that this 
cause of action overlaps with two portions of ERISA’s 
comprehensive enforcement scheme:  § 502(a)(1)(B), which 
allows a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due 
“under the terms of his plan,” and § 502(a)(3), which allows a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to seek equitable relief in 
order to enforce any provision of a plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
According to the defendant, because the remedies that the 
PWA offers mirror or supplement those that are provided for 
in ERISA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme, ERISA 
completely preempts the PWA. 
 
We disagree.  Turning to the Pascack Valley test’s 
second prong, courts have held that a legal duty is 
“independent” if it is not based on an obligation under an 
ERISA plan, or if it “would exist whether or not an ERISA 
plan existed.”  Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 
Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).  In other 
words, if the state law claim is not “derived from, or 
conditioned upon” the terms of an ERISA plan, and 
“[n]obody needs to interpret the plan to determine whether 
that duty exists,” then the duty is independent.  Gardner v. 
Heartland Indus. Partners, LP, 715 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 
2013); accord Stevenson v. Bank of N.Y. Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 
56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
The PWA creates just such an independent legal duty.  
The defendant’s duty to pay prevailing wages derives from 
the PWA, not any ERISA plan.  No interpretation of any 
ERISA plan is necessary in order to determine whether the 
carpenters were paid prevailing wages.  The defendant would 
be required to pay prevailing wages regardless of whether any 
ERISA plan existed. 
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The PWA’s independence is best understood by 
looking to the what the plaintiffs must prove to prevail.  To 
determine whether the defendant is liable, a court must 
simply compare the amount that the carpenters were paid to 
the amount that they were owed under the PWA.  If there is a 
deficiency, the defendant can make it up through cash, even if 
the deficiency concerns the benefit prong of the PWA.  No 
reference to any ERISA plan is necessary.  The statute simply 
requires that the Commissioner set a prevailing wage, and 
that employers engaged in public works projects pay it.  
 
As such, the PWA is a law that regulates wages.  
“States have traditionally regulated the payment of wages,” 
not the federal government.  Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 
U.S. 107, 119 (1989).  Congress did not intend for ERISA to 
displace statutes that govern wages.  See Keystone Chapter, 
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 
945, 959 (3d Cir. 1994).  State actions to recover unpaid 
wages generally are not expressly preempted by ERISA, 
much less completely preempted. Cf. id. (viewing the 
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act as an instance of wage 
regulation and concluding that it was not expressly preempted 
by ERISA § 514). 
 
Pascack Valley provides an illustration of a similar 
independent duty.  There, a hospital brought suit in state court 
against an ERISA plan for breach of contract.  Pascack 
Valley, 388 F.3d at 395.  The hosptial contended that it was 
not paid the proper amount for services rendered pursuant to 
the terms of a contract that was separate from any ERISA 
plan.  Id. at 396.  The plan removed the case to federal court, 
contending that the breach of contract claim was actually for 
benefits owed pursuant to an ERISA plan, and therefore 
completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a).  Id. at 397.  We 
held that removal was improper because resolution of the 
hospital’s claim turned on the terms of an agreement that was 
separate from the ERISA plan.  Id. at 402.  In order to resolve 
the dispute, a court simply needed to compare the prices 
provided for in the agreement to the amounts that the hospital 
was paid.  No analysis of the plan’s terms was required.  This 
was sufficient to create an independent legal duty, even 
though the patients who received services at the hospital 
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received them pursuant to the terms of the plan.  Id. at 403-
04.
2
 
 
As the obligation to pay prevailing wages is an 
independent legal duty, the second prong of the Pascack 
Valley test is not met.
3
  Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims are 
not completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a), and that 
section cannot provide the basis for federal court jurisdiction.
4
   
                                              
2
 The District Court in this case also found the fact that one of 
the parties in this case was an ERISA plan was significant.  
We rejected a similar argument in Pascack Valley.  There, the 
plan argued that removal was proper because suits between 
plans and third parties that implicate benefit administration 
necessarily “arise under ERISA’s federal common law.”  
Pascack Valley, 388 F.3d at 399 (quotation marks omitted).  
We held that it was not the identity of the parties to the 
dispute that mattered, but whether the federal common law of 
ERISA provided an “element — essential or otherwise” of the 
plaintiff’s state law claim.  Id.  Our focus was on the nature of 
the cause of action, not the identity of the parties. 
3
 Because we conclude that the defendant cannot meet the 
second prong of the test, we need not decide whether it could 
have met the first prong. 
4
 As we conclude that the District Court was without 
jurisdiction to consider whether the PWA is expressly 
preempted by ERISA § 514, we have no occasion to address 
that portion of the District Court’s opinion.  See Dukes v. 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, 
but the plaintiff’s state claim is arguably preempted under § 
514(a), the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, 
cannot resolve the dispute regarding [express] preemption.”).  
Upon remand to state court, the defendant may still raise 
express preemption as a defense to the plaintiffs’ PWA claim.  
We note, however, that we have held that Pennsylvania’s 
PWA, which is substantially similar to the New Jersey PWA, 
was not expressly preempted, and that every other Court of 
Appeals to answer this question with respect to similar PWAs 
has found them not expressly preempted.  See Keystone 
Chapter, 37 F.3d at 945; see also Associated Builders & 
Contractors, Saginaw Valley Area Chapter v. Perry, 115 F.3d 
386, 392-93 (6th Cir. 1997) (Michigan PWA not preempted 
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B. 
 
The District Court did not decide whether removal was 
proper under LMRA § 301, or whether the LMRA completely 
preempted the plaintiffs’ claims.  The failure to reach the 
LMRA issue does not necessarily preclude us from 
addressing it on appeal.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell 
USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 97 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is appropriate 
for us to reach an issue that the district court did not if “the 
issues provide purely legal questions, upon which an 
appellate court exercises plenary review.”  Hudson United 
Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Had the District Court reached these issues, our 
review would have been plenary.  See Kline v. Sec. Guards, 
Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 251 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (exercising plenary 
review over the question of whether removal was proper 
under LMRA § 301). 
 
LMRA § 301 provides exclusive federal jurisdiction 
for suits concerning “violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization.”  29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  
Similar to ERISA § 502(a), LMRA § 301 converts state 
causes of action into federal ones and allows removal “when 
the heart of the state-law complaint is a clause in the 
collective bargaining agreement.”  Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (quotation marks 
omitted).  “[T]he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as 
to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization.  Any 
such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding 
the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the 
absence of § 301.”  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23 
(quotation marks and footnote omitted).  
LMRA § 301 completely preempts a state cause of 
action only when the resolution of said action is “substantially 
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made 
                                                                                                     
by ERISA); Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep’t of 
Labor, 107 F.3d 1000 (2d Cir. 1997) (New York); WSB 
Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (California); 
Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. 
Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(Minnesota). 
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between the parties in a labor contract.”  Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see also Lingle v. 
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) 
(“[A]n application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such 
application requires the interpretation of a collective-
bargaining agreement.”).  By contrast, when resolution of the 
state law claim is “independent” of a CBA and does not 
require construing one, the state law claim is not preempted 
by § 301.  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410; accord Antol v. Esposto, 
100 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The plaintiffs’ claim under the PWA is not preempted 
by the LMRA because it exists independent of any CBA.  
Proving a PWA violation does not require any reference to or 
analysis of any CBA.  It simply requires comparing the wages 
that plaintiffs were paid to those provided in the PWA.  This 
is a factual question that, just as it does not turn on the 
interpretation of any ERISA plan, does not turn on the 
interpretation of any CBA.  The carpenters’ right to 
prevailing wages is grounded in the PWA and would exist 
even in the absence of any CBA.   
 
Although the amount owed to the employees under the 
PWA may be the same amount owed by virtue of their CBA, 
such “parallelism” does “not render the state-law analysis 
dependent upon the [CBA] analysis.”  Kline, 386 F.3d at 254 
(quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court has explicitly 
held that even if dispute resolution pursuant to a CBA and a 
state law would require addressing “precisely the same set of 
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without 
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of 
the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.”  Lingle, 486 
U.S. at 410. 
 
Furthermore, “§ 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-
empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees 
as a matter of state law.”  Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 
123 (1994).  The right to prevailing wages is just such an 
inalienable right.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.40 (allowing 
workers to bring private actions to recover wages under the 
PWA and providing that “any agreement between such 
workman and the employer to work for less than such 
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prevailing wage shall be no defense to the action.”); accord 
Cipparulo v. David Friedland Painting Co., 353 A.2d 105, 
106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).  “[Section] 301 pre-
emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for 
interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says 
nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to 
workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend 
upon the interpretation of [CBAs].”  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409.  
The plaintiffs have asserted a substantive right under the New 
Jersey PWA to be paid prevailing wages.  This right is not 
preempted by the LMRA.
5
 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing the case and remand the action with 
instructions for the District Court to remand the action to state 
court.
 
 
 
                                              
5
 Because we hold that the neither ERISA nor the LMRA 
completely preempts the PWA in these circumstances, and 
that the District Court lacked removal jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ claims, we will not opine on any of the other 
arguments raised by either party, such as whether the 
workers’ claims were properly assignable to the plaintiff 
funds.  Such questions may be properly raised in the New 
Jersey state court upon remand. 
